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This paper deals both with the issues of confounding and of control, as the definition of 
a confounding factor is far from universal and there exist different methodological 
approaches, ex ante and ex post, for controlling for a confounding factor.  In the first 
section the paper compares some definitions of a confounder given in the demographic 
and epidemiological literature with the definition of a confounder as a common cause of 
both treatment/exposure and response/outcome.  In the second section, the paper 
examines confounder control from the data collection viewpoint and recalls the 
stratification approach for ex post control.  The paper finally raises the issue of 
controlling for a common cause or for intervening variables, focusing in particular on 
latent confounders.   
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1. Introduction  
In a recent paper on trends in cardiovascular diseases (CVD) in Europe (Kesteloot, Sans 
and Kromhout 2006), the authors attribute the dramatic current decline in mortality in 
the Baltic States to a change in dietary habits, i.e. the greater consumption of vegetable 
oil for cooking and the progressive replacement of butter by low-fat margarine.  Though 
nutrition does indeed play a significant role on the incidence of CVD, one may also 
postulate (Gaumé and  Wunsch 2003) in the case of the Baltic States that the 
tremendous change from a communist regime to a liberal one has led to systemic 
repercussions in the whole society which have brought about both modifications in 
cardiovascular mortality (through major fluctuations in stressful events), in economic 
conditions, and in behaviours including nutrition.  Societal transformations and 
contextual changes in the economic, social (including public health), and political 
spheres would therefore be a confounder masking the true relation between changes in 
mortality patterns and in nutritional ones.  To put it simply, correlation of time series 
does not imply causation.   
To take another example that will be discussed later in this paper, medical reports 
in the 1920s already pointed out the suspected links between tobacco and cancers, and a 
1938 article in the journal Science suggested that heavy smokers had a shorter life 
expectancy than nonsmokers. In 1939, F.H. Müller also published a paper in German on 
the relationship between smoking and lung cancer (Bartecchi, MacKenzie and Schreier 
1995, Freedman, 1999).   Though one now knows that smoking is bad for one’s health, 
actually it is only in the early 1950s that  two influential case-control studies, by 
Wynder and Graham in the U.S. and by Doll and Hill in the U.K., showed that cigarette 
smoking was a plausible cause of lung cancer. The relationship was confirmed by two 
prospective studies conducted by Doll and Hill in the U.K. and by Hammond and Horn 
in the U.S. (Schlesselman 2006). Even then the relationship between lung cancer and 
cigarette smoking was hotly disputed by a respectable scientist such as R.A. Fisher who 
argued as above that correlation was not causation.  When is a correlation causal and 
when is it the result of confounding?  This is the issue tackled here, by recalling some 
well-known and lesser-known facts.  On the other hand, I will not be concerned with 
the diagnosis of causation and the assessment of evidence (see Elwood 1988, chapter 
8).  
Confounding is not a new issue.  In philosophy of science, Hans Reichenbach 
(1956) already showed the presence of screening-off effects between two variables in 
conjunctive forks, due to the existence of a common cause.  For Reichenbach, a 
conjunctive fork is a causal structure where two (or more) effects have a common cause 
and where the effects are conditionally independent given the common cause: the 
association between the effects disappears when one controls for or conditions on the Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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common cause.  The example of the drop in atmospheric pressure causing both a storm 
and a barometer dip is well-known.  Simpson’s paradox too is a classic example of 
confounding (Rouanet 1985).  Simpson’s paradox refers to the reversal of the direction 
of an association when data from several groups are combined to form a single group.  
In demography, one knows since the end of the 19
th century that the differences in 
mortality between countries or regions might be due to their differential age structure 
only.  The latter confounds in this case the actual geographical mortality pattern that 
one would observe in the absence of confounders.  To give other examples in the field 
of demography, poverty might confound the relationship between alcohol consumption 
and mortality. Family background characteristics may confound the relationship 
between maternal age and child development. Education is a potential confounder of 
the relationship between obesity and mortality, as obesity prevalence varies 
significantly across groups by education level, in the U.S. for example, and mortality 
differentials by education level are observed overall.  In this case however, one could 
also argue that obesity might lead to poorer results in school, leading to a two-way 
causation between both variables.  Nonrecursive systems (reciprocal causation or 
feedback loops) will however not be discussed in this paper. 
In all these cases, the recommended remedy is to control for the confounding 
factor, e.g. the atmospheric pressure in the weather example or the age structure in the 
demographic case.  This paper will deal both with the issues of confounding and of 
control, as the definition of a confounding factor is far from universal and there exist 
different methodological approaches, ex ante and ex post, for controlling for a 
confounding factor.  As a visual representation of conditional independence structures, I 
will use directed acyclic graphs (DAG) where nodes represent variables and directed 
edges (single-headed arrows) the possible impact of the variable at the base of the edge 
on the variable at the head of the edge.  Graphical models of this type, and the related 
conditional independence assumptions, are discussed in e.g. Best and Green (2005).   It 
should be pointed out too, following Pearl (2000) and Dawid (2002), that one should 
distinguish between conditioning by observation and by intervention.  To be succinct, 
the section on control will only consider the conditioning approach on observational 
data, though one may intervene in the population field by changing public policies.  
Note that many demographic characteristics such as age, sex or ethnicity can hardly be 
manipulated though they are well-known risk factors of e.g. AIDS. Causes understood 
as risk factors are not restricted to variables which can be manipulated. For example, we 
know that older men have a higher risk of developing prostate cancer than younger 
men.  We cannot manipulate age of course but we can develop preventive measures 
which can lead and have led to a reduction in mortality due to this cancer. Other 
methods of control are briefly presented and discussed in Wunsch, Linde-Zwirble and Wunsch: Confounding and control  
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Angus  (2006).  For the issue of conditioning by intervention and the use of influence 
diagrams, see Dawid (2002). 
 
 
2. Confounding  
2.1 What is confounding?  
In epidemiology and in demography, when one examines  the impact of a treatment or 
exposure on a response or outcome, a confounding variable or confounder is often  
defined  as a variable associated both with the putative cause and with its effect (see e.g. 
Jenicek and Cléroux 1982, Elwood 1988).  Sometimes the definition is more precise, 
such as in  Anderson et al. (1980) or Leridon and Toulemon (1997).   According to 
these authors, a variable, or background factor, is a confounder whenever two 
conditions simultaneously hold: 
 
1.  The risk  groups differ on this variable; 
2.  The variable itself influences the outcome.  
 
To condition one, some authors furthermore add that the background factor should not 
be a consequence of the putative cause (Schlesselman 1982).   
For example, if we examine the impact of cigarette smoking on the incidence of 
cancer of the respiratory system, a variable such as exposure to asbestos dust confounds 
the relation between smoking and this type of cancer. Exposure to asbestos dust and 
smoking are associated, i.e. there are proportionally more persons exposed to asbestos 
in the smoking group than in the non-smoking group.  Condition 1 is therefore satisfied.  
In addition, inhaling asbestos dust is a strong cause of cancer of the pleura; condition 2 
is thus also satisfied.  Cancer is the outcome variable in this example, smoking a 
potential cause, and exposure to asbestos a confounder.  Vice-versa if one were to 
examine the impact of asbestos exposure on the incidence of cancer of the respiratory 
system, smoking this time would be the confounding factor, as it is associated with 
asbestos exposure and is a cause of lung cancer.  This simplified example is developed 
in Russo et al. (2006); an actual study would also consider the synergistic effects 
between smoking and asbestos exposure, time-lags and duration of exposure
2, and other 
causal factors and paths.   
                                                        
2 Contrary to tabacism, there is of course no addiction to asbestos exposure but the duration of exposure must 
be considered. Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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2.2 A confounder as a common cause  
Condition 1 needs to be clarified however. Why are smoking and asbestos exposure 
associated?  Hans Reichenbach (1956) was one of the first, if not the first, in philosophy 
to point out that simultaneous correlated events must have a prior common cause: “If 
improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common cause” (p.157).  At 
around the same time, statisticians were also aware that a correlation between two 
variables could be due to a common cause.  Considering once again the correlation 
between smoking and lung cancer, suppose that one’s unknown genotype (G) would 
influence both smoking behaviour or tabacism (T) and the susceptibility to lung cancer 
(C).  This explanation was proposed by the statistician R.A. Fisher when he was 
scientific consultant to the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee in the late 
1950s (Fisher 1957).  Thus, “without any direct causation being involved, both 
characteristics might be largely influenced by a common cause, in this case the 
individual genotype” (Fisher 1958).  The corresponding causal graph is presented in 
figure 1 with possibly no causal link at all between T and C.   
Fisher’s suggestion was ultimately disproved but it did show that proving the 
relation between lung cancer and cigarette smoking required not only sound 
epidemiological evidence, but also replication in different studies, experimental 
evidence from animal studies, and a plausible biological mechanism linking smoking to 
lung cancer.   
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Coming back to the question ‘why are smoking and asbestos exposure 
associated?’, one knows in demography and in epidemiology that both smoking and 
asbestos exposure are dependent upon one’s socio-economic status (SES): those with a 
lower SES tend more to smoke and work in unhealthy environments than those with a 
higher SES.  The causal graph can therefore be drawn as in figure 2, where A represents 
exposure to asbestos, T tabacism, and C cancer incidence.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Socio-economic status (SES), tabacism (T), asbestos exposure (A),  










This graph shows that tabacism and asbestos exposure are in fact not independent 
from one another as they are both related to one’s SES, i.e. they have a common cause. 
This association or correlation is represented here by a non-directed edge
3 between A 
and T.   Note that SES is also a common cause of T and C as it has an impact on cancer 
through the intervening or intermediate variable asbestos exposure A, a variable on the 
path from SES to C.   
An association between two variables such as smoking and asbestos exposure 
could however also be due to a causal relation between them.   T could be a cause of  A 
or vice-versa. The first situation, T causes A, is represented in figure 3; A is an 
intervening variable between T and C in this case. 
                                                        
3 Some authors represent an association between two variables by a double-headed arrow.  This representation 
is however more suited to feedback effects in nonrecursive models. Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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The second case is represented by figure 4, A being this time a common cause of T 
and C. 
 







This distinction leads to a more precise definition of a confounder: a confounding 
variable or confounder is a variable which is a common cause of both the putative cause 
and its outcome (Bollen1989, Pearl 2000). For example, A confounds the relation 
between T and C in figure 4 because it is in this model a common cause of both T and 
C.  For the same reason, SES is a confounder in figure 2, as it is a common cause of 
both T and C (the latter via A).  In figure 3, the intervening variable A is not a common Wunsch: Confounding and control  
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cause of T and C; A does not therefore confound the relation between T and C.  The 
confounder can be either latent (i.e. unobserved) or observed.  From the point of view 
of controlling for the confounder, the two cases are obviously quite different (see Cox 
and Wermuth 2004). This definition avoids taking an intervening (intermediate) 
variable between the putative cause and the outcome such as in figure 3 as a 
confounder, even though it is associated with the putative cause (as the latter has a 
causal influence on the former) and it has an impact on the outcome. Many definitions 
given in epidemiology or demography are not adequate in this respect. As one can 
presume, the possible confounder should not be affected by treatment/exposure 
(Schlesselman 1982).   
Finally, how does conditional independence relate to confounding and control? 
Using the so-called d-separation criteria, it is possible in causal graphs to check for 
conditional independence (Pearl 2000, Robins 2001).  Considering three disjoint sets of 
variables X, Y, and Z, which are represented as nodes in a DAG, following Pearl a path 
between X and Y is d-separated or blocked by a set of nodes Z if and only if the path 
contains a chain x → z → y or a fork x ← z → y such that the middle node z is in Z, or 
the path contains an inverted fork or collider x → m ← y such that the middle node m is 
not in Z and such that no descendant of m is in Z.  Our definition of confounding relates 
to the fork x ← z → y.  In this case, z should be controlled in order to assess the 
relation between x and y, but what happens if we control for z or for m in the case of a 
chain or a collider? These questions are examined in the following section, more 
particularly in sub-sections 3.6 to 3.8. 
 
 
3. Control  
3.1 Controlling ex ante: randomisation in prospective studies  
If possible confounding is suspected, it should ideally be taken into account at the 
design stage of the study (see e.g. Rothman and Greenland 1998, Lee 2005).  The best 
way to avoid confounding bias in a prospective study is ex ante randomisation, i.e. a 
random allocation of subjects between the ‘treatment’ and the ‘control’ groups. In the 
simplest case, the first group receives the treatment and the second a placebo
4.  
Moreover, in view of avoiding investigator bias, the procedure should be kept secret 
from the investigator.  Actually, double-blind experiments are often conducted in 
clinical epidemiology, both the clinician and the subject ignoring whether the latter is 
put into the treatment group or into the control group.  Double-blind studies avoid 
                                                        
4 For an introduction to more complex experimental designs, see Brown and Melamed (1990). Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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optimism bias i.e., “unrealistic expectations, for both patients and clinicians, of the 
likely benefits of new treatments in randomised trials” (Chalmers and Matthews 2006).  
Randomisation ensures to a high extent that both groups differ only by the fact that one 
receives the treatment (the ‘cause’) and the other not.  The causal relation between 
treatment and outcome (e.g. recovery) is not affected by a confounder - observed or 
unobserved - due to the fact that the two groups are similar in all respects except 
treatment/no treatment.  In particular there is no selection bias.  The absence of 
selection bias does not mean however that the target group is homogeneous as concerns 
treatment effect; the group may contain sub-groups which vary widely in response to 
the treatment (Schwartz 1994). For example, in the target group females may react 
better to the treatment than males, younger persons than older ones, etc.  If known, 
these factors can be taken into account in the experimental design by stratified 
randomisation (factorial design).  For example, if one suspects that the treatment effect 
may vary by gender, one will enter both treatment and gender in the same experiment.  
An ANOVA will then yield the separate and interactive effects of treatment and gender. 
However, unobserved heterogeneity may remain due to the presence of unknown latent 
factors of e.g. genetic origin.  A randomised experiment furthermore does not show 
how the treatment will be used in the real world: who will desire the treatment and who 
will opt out, what will be his or her compliance, what will be the unwanted indirect 
effects of the treatment (Smith 2003).  For example, the pill is a highly effective method 
of contraception under laboratory conditions (theoretical effectiveness) but in practice 
(use-effectiveness) it may nevertheless lead to many unwanted pregnancies if it is 
carelessly used.  
Though quite common in clinical studies, randomisation can however be unethical 
or impossible to conduct.  For moral reasons, one may not randomly allocate subjects, 
for example, between a smoking group and a non-smoking group, or between receiving 
a treatment A and no treatment at all if an alternative treatment is already available.  
Presently, in clinical trials, the alternative treatment must be given to the control group 
instead of a placebo. Furthermore, subjects are now required to give their consent in 
order to participate in the study. To give another example, allocating subjects to 
different income groups in order to examine the causal relation between income and 
fertility would not be unethical but impractical. For these reasons, randomisation is very 
often impossible in the social sciences.  It is however practised in educational studies, 
among others, in order to compare e.g. the performance of students following a physics 
course based on lectures to a physics course based on project development. In addition, 
to avoid course-teacher interaction, teachers are usually rotated between both types of 
courses.  Finally, all prospective studies - randomized or not - are affected by loss to 
follow-up.  If those who drop out of the study differ from those who stay, the relation 
between treatment and outcome may become biased.  Wunsch: Confounding and control  
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3.2 Treatment selection in  non-experimental studies  
In prospective studies with non-random allocation, there is always a risk that the 
characteristic on which the allocation is done is associated with the outcome, inducing 
unobserved heterogeneity so that the treatment effect cannot be distinguished from the 
selection effect, though matching (in particular  propensity score matching) can to some 
extent reduce the problem (Lee 2005).  A propensity score is the predicted probability 
of receiving the treatment/being exposed, taking into account observed covariates. For 
the two-group case, one can run a logistic regression with the dependent variable Y = 1 
if treated and Y = 0 if not, with appropriate observed conditioning variables One then 
obtains the probability score or predicted probability or odds of treatment (or non-
treatment) selection.  Each participant in the treatment is then matched with one or 
more non-participants on the basis of their propensity score.  For a practical example, 
see e.g. Foster (2003). A major disadvantage of this method, as Heckman (2005) has 
shown, is that it assumes that the marginal person receiving treatment is the same as the 
average person. On the contrary, the method of control functions (see Heckman op. cit.) 
allows the marginal treatment effect to be different from the average treatment effect.  
Another approach at the design stage is to take into account an instrumental 
variable
5 (IV), the IV being highly correlated with the treatment but independent of the 
suspected latent confounder - or error term -  possibly influencing both treatment and 
outcome. For example, prices of cigarettes might be taken as an IV when studying the 
relation between tabacism of the mother and child birthweight. Price should affect the 
likelihood of being a smoker but there is no reason to believe it affects birthweight 
through another path (this and several other examples are discussed in Moffitt 2003). A 
two-stage procedure yields in this case a non-biased estimation if the IV has been well 
chosen, i.e. if it satisfies the two criteria pointed out above (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 
1996). In the analysis, the treatment influenced by the latent confounder is ‘replaced’ by 
an IV independent of the latter (see the paragraph on latent confounders below). 
Actually, it is hardly possible to check the independence assumption between IV and 
error term, as the latter is latent, except on the basis of background knowledge.  
In retrospective studies, ex ante randomisation is not possible, as the subjects 
either have or have not been subjected to the treatment and to the outcome (Holland and 
Rubin 1988).  A case-control study on the relation between smoking and lung cancer 
would compare the past smoking history of persons alive with lung cancer, i.e. those 
having experienced the outcome, to a control group of ex post randomly selected 
persons without lung cancer (Khlat 1994, and the other articles in the special issue of 
this journal on case-control studies).  The method is however subject to information 
bias, i.e. recall lapses which differ among cases and controls   (Wunsch, Linde-Zwirble 
                                                        
5 A somewhat similar approach  had been proposed by H.M. Blalock  (1961). Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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and Angus  2006). Several controls are usually matched to each case on possible 
observed confounders such as age or gender.  Matching does not ensure however that 
cases and controls are alike on latent variables.  All possible sources of confounding 
bias are not avoided, contrary to ex ante randomisation in prospective studies.  In 
addition, the comparison between cases and controls can be done in terms of odds ratios 
but not of relative risks, as the population exposed to risk is unknown.  Finally, as in all 
retrospective studies, only persons alive are included in the study and they may differ 
from those who have died.  On the other hand, retrospective case-control studies are 
much less expensive and time-consuming to carry out than prospective randomised 
trials.  Case-control studies are too rarely conducted in the social sciences and in 
demography in particular. 
 
 
3.3 Controlling ex post in non-experimental studies  
In non-experimental (observational) studies, prospective or retrospective, the two major 
ex post approaches for controlling for confounders are stratification for categorical 
variables and statistical adjustment for numerical variables.  This distinction is not 
clear-cut however, as statistical adjustment can be applied to categorical variables using 
e.g. logit regression, and a numerical variable can always be categorised – age can be 
transformed into age groups for example.  These approaches can take into account 
observed confounders but are hardly able to control for latent ones.  To keep this paper 
succinct, the stratification approach will mainly be developed here; for other methods, 
see e.g.  Wunsch, Linde-Zwirble and Angus (2006). 
In an observational study, stratification implies conditioning on the confounding 
variable(s).  This approach will be considered in the case of the well-known Simpson’s 
paradox; the example is taken from Pearl (2000, pp. 174-175).  In a population 
suffering from a disease, one sub-population follows a treatment and the other does not. 
The treatment increases the recovery rate when both genders are combined.  On the 
other hand, when gender is taken into account (controlled for), the drug decreases the 
recovery rate both for males and for females, thus the paradox.  Table 1 distributes the 
population by treatment, recovery, and gender.   
 
 Wunsch: Confounding and control  
108   http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table 1:  Treatment, recovery, and gender  
 
Both genders  Recovery  No recovery  Total  Recovery rate   
Treatment 20  20  40  .50   
No treatment  16  24  40  .40   
Total 36  44  80     
Males          
Treatment 18  12  30  .60   
No treatment  7  3  10  .70   
Total 25  15  40     
Females          
Treatment 2  8  10  .20   
No treatment  9  21  30  .30   
Total 11  29  40     
 
Source: Pearl, 2000 
 
It is easy to show why the treatment seems to have an effect in the general 
population while this conclusion does not hold in each gender category.  The combined 
recovery rates in the Treatment and No treatment groups can be written as follows: 
 
(30 x 0.60 + 10 x 0.20)/40 = 0.50 for the Treatment group 
(10 x 0.70 + 30 x 0.30)/40 = 0.40 for the No treatment group 
 
In the Treatment group, there is a higher proportion of males than females, and 
males have a higher recovery rate than females.  The opposite is true in the No 
treatment group.   Males thus opt for treatment more than females and they have a 
higher recovery rate because, for example, their compliance might be higher.  Gender is 
therefore a confounding factor, as the two sub-populations differ by gender structure 
(i.e., gender has an impact on opting for treatment or not) and gender influences the 
recovery rate.  To put it briefly, unconditional independence does not imply conditional 
independence and vice versa. 
 
 
3.4 Standardisation  
In order to obtain an unbiased global indicator, gender combined, standardisation is 
often recommended: the rates by gender are applied to a same arbitrary standard 
population structure.  This procedure actually ‘blocks’ in this example the causal link 
from gender to treatment use. Blocking the link from the confounder to either the cause Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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or the outcome is sufficient for controlling for the confounder.   For example, taking the 
Treatment population structure as standard, one would obtain the following global rates: 
 
(30 x 0.60 + 10 x 0.20)/40 = 0.50 for the Treatment group 
(30 x 0.70 + 10 x 0.30)/40 = 0.60 for the No treatment group 
 
This time, the combined standardized rate does lead to the same conclusion  as the 
analysis by gender: the recovery rate (both genders) is lower in the Treatment group 
than in the No treatment group. Furthermore, no interaction is present here as the 
absolute difference is the same for males and for females, i.e. 10 per cent.  In this 
situation, the same global result would be obtained whatever the standard population.  
The treatment should therefore be discontinued. 
However, standardisation breaks down when there are interaction effects (see 
Wunsch 2006, for a general discussion).  In the case of strong interaction, no linear 
combination of rates can represent the true results because more than one indicator per 
group is required in this situation. If this were the case in the present example, no 
averaging of the results by gender could lead to a satisfactory global indicator.  For 
example, consider the situation where the recovery rates would be 0.60 (males) and 
0.40 (females) in the Treatment group, and respectively 0.70 and 0.30 in the No 
treatment group.  According to the choice of the arbitrary standard population, one 
could say that the global recovery rate in the Treatment group is lower, equal, or higher 
than in the No treatment group, a conclusion which is not very informative!  No sole 
measure can tell us that the recovery rate for males is lower in the Treatment group 
compared to the No treatment group while the converse is true for females (i.e. strong 
interaction between treatment and gender).  
 
 
3.5 Multilevel modelling  
Suppose now that the hospital where the patients are treated is associated both with 
treatment and recovery.  In addition to taking a sample of patients per hospital, one can 
also draw a sample of hospitals and take into account both the treatment effect at the 
individual level and the hospital effect at the contextual level, using a multilevel model.  
Daniel Courgeau has shown that this type of model elegantly resolves Simpson’s 
paradox; it can furthermore include interaction terms between the individual and 
contextual variables (Courgeau 2002, Courgeau 2003).  The approach lies however 
outside the scope of this paper.  
 Wunsch: Confounding and control  
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3.6 To control … ?  
When should we control for a background variable and when should we not control for 
this variable, when examining the impact of a treatment/exposure on an outcome in an 
observational (i.e. non-experimental) study?  In other words, is this variable a 
confounder or not?  If the background variable is a common cause of both 
treatment/exposure and outcome, it should be controlled for.  Let us go back to the 
previous figures 2 to 4.  In figure 2, SES has to be controlled for in this model if one 
wants to estimate the impact of smoking on cancer of the respiratory system in the 
absence of confounding, taking into account the definition of a confounder given in the 
previous section. SES is a common cause of smoking (exposure) and of cancer 
(outcome) via A, as SES is in the DAG a parent of both tabacism and asbestos 
exposure. In this case, conditional on SES, the variables tabacism and asbestos 
exposure should become independent and the association between them should 
disappear; if not, a latent common cause is most probably present.  To give another 
example, in the model of figure 4, if one is interested in the relation between T and C, A 
should be controlled for as A is a common cause of both the exposure T and the 
outcome C.   
 
 
3.7 Controlling for a latent confounder  
Suppose now that SES is itself latent, i.e. unobserved.   We could also block the impact 
of SES by controlling for A on the path from SES to C (the outcome), as A is observed, 
or by conditioning on an observed intermediate variable between SES and T (the 
treatment/exposure).  In the absence of such observed intervening variables, we could 
also control for any observed variable K (e.g. income) deemed to be highly correlated 
with the latent variable SES on the basis of our background knowledge, using K as a 
surrogate for SES (Hernán et al. 2002). The correlation between K and SES can be 
causal or not; the observed K is then used in place of the unobserved SES. To give 
some examples from the literature, sex can be used as a proxy for gender, educational 
level for income, country of origin for ethnicity, infant mortality rate for income 
distribution, etc., if it is deemed that there is a strong correlation between the proxy and 
the variable of interest.   
We could also use an instrumental variable (IV) approach (Stock and Watson 
2003), choosing an IV such that the correlation or covariance between the IV and the 
putative cause is strong (instrument relevance) while the correlation or covariance 
between the IV and the latent confounder is nil (instrument  exogeneity). For example, 
prices of health inputs are the most common instrumental variable for identifying Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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estimates of the causal effects of health inputs on health outcomes.  The sex 
composition of the first two births in families with at least two children has been used 
as an IV to estimate the effect of additional children on parents' labour supply.  Ways to 
partially test these conditions can be found in the econometric literature.  Furthermore, 
procedures robust to the presence of weak instruments are being developed. 
Note the resemblance and the difference between the surrogate and the 
instrumental variable approaches (figure 5). In the surrogate case we use a proxy of 
SES while the IV approach uses a proxy of T. One assumes in the IV approach that the 
covariance between IV and SES is nil while the covariance between IV and T is strong. 
In the surrogate approach, one assumes on the contrary that the covariance between K 
and SES is high. More precisely, one has the following independence assumptions. 
For the IV approach: 
IV ╨ SES 
IV ╨ C  T 
The second condition stems from the fact that the only path from IV to C must be 
through T (Angrist and Krueger 2001); this last constraint is often overlooked in 
econometric textbooks.  
For the surrogate approach : 
K ╨ T, C  SES 
This condition states that the only path from K to T and C is through SES.  On the other 
hand, C is not independent of T given SES, as one postulates that smoking is a cause of 
cancer.  
 
Figure 5:  Surrogates and instrumental variables  
K SES
IV T C
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If longitudinal data are available, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity due 
to unknown omitted variables using a time and/or entity fixed effects regression model
6.  
This approach assumes that omitted variables are constant over time but vary among 
entities (observation units) while others are constant across entities but vary over time 
(Stock and Watson op. cit.).  If these assumptions do not hold, the surrogate and IV 
approaches remain valuable methods of control if we have some knowledge concerning 
the latent confounder(s).  One’s conceptual framework, based on background 
knowledge, formal theory, informal evidence, and research hypotheses, should take into 
account for this purpose all known observed and latent variables relevant for the 
problem at hand (Moffitt 2003, Gérard 2006). 
Even if SES is observed in the model of figure 2, it would still be advisable to 
control for A instead of the common cause SES if we want to measure the impact of 
smoking on cancer.  SES might not be the only common cause of T and A, as pointed 
out in the previous paragraph.  For example, smoking and occupation are gender-
dependent; gender would also be a common cause.  To give another example, an 
unknown gene G may make some smokers and asbestos inhalers more susceptible to 
cancer; the effects of smoking and asbestos exposure would then be associated through 
the common genotype. The common cause might also be too remote from the causal 
relations studied. For example, one could argue that one’s SES is dependent upon one’s 
parents’ SES and control for the latter.  However, the more remote, the less influence 
the common cause probably has on the variables downstream in the model. I would 
therefore usually recommend controlling for more proximate intervening variables on 
the path from a common cause to the outcome than on the common cause itself if the 
latter is much further upstream in the causal graph, especially in the social sciences 
where multiple latent common causes are probably the norm.  Note that in this case one 
falls back on the classic definition of a confounder as a variable associated with the 
treatment/exposure (through the presence of a common ‘ancestor’) and having an 
impact on the outcome. 
 
 
3.8 … or not to control?  
Controlling for a variable that is not a confounder can be harmful.  In the model of 
figure 3, A should not be controlled for when studying the total impact (direct and 
indirect) of T on C, as A is not a confounder but an intermediate variable in the indirect 
path going from T to C through A, in addition to the direct path T to C.  Controlling for 
A would only be justified if one wished to evaluate solely the direct effect of T on C.  
                                                        
6 Do not confuse with a fixed effects ANOVA model where levels are deliberately set by the researcher. Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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To give another example, it would be inadequate to control for the physical 
characteristics of the child (e.g. gestation duration) when measuring the impact of age 
of the mother on neonatal mortality, as these characteristics are often dependent upon 
this age.  Physical characteristics of the child are an intermediate variable on the path 
from mother’s age to neonatal mortality. 
Furthermore, controlling for a common effect of a treatment and an outcome 
creates a spurious association between the latter two (Hernán et al. op. cit.), in addition 
to a possible treatment effect.   This is due to the fact that two causes become correlated 
when one controls for their common effect (or collider).  As an example, Hernán 
considers two independent variables - diet and non-diet-related cancer - which become 
associated once we control for weight loss, a common effect of both diet and cancer.  
One should therefore not condition on a common effect of two (or more) variables. 
Another situation where it would be inappropriate to control for a covariate is the 
case of a conjunction of causes of the type XZ   Y, i.e. X and Z jointly cause Y.  To 
give an example, in the case of fertility transition, Ansley Coale (1973) considers that 
several necessary conditions (conscious choice, advantage, effective techniques) have 
to be simultaneously satisfied for fertility to fall in high fertility countries.  If at least 
one of these conditions is not satisfied, fertility will not decrease: for a decline in 
fertility to occur, the conjunction of the three conditions is required.  A causality of 
conjunctions of causes has been  proposed in philosophy of science by John Stuart Mill 
(1889) and Richard Taylor (1966), and by John Mackie (1974) with his INUS causality. 
Take the very simple situation where the three variables X, Z, Y, are dichotomous 
(presence/absence).  One obtains in this case the following results 
 
Cause X  Cause Z  Outcome Y 
1 1  1 
0 1  0 
1 0  0 
0 0  0 
 
Controlling for Z (conditioning on Z) means examining the relation between X and 
Y  for Z = 1 or Z = 0.  If Z = 1, one would conclude that X is a necessary and sufficient 
cause of Y because “if X , then Y” and if “non X, then non Y”.  On the contrary, if Z = 
0, one would conclude that X is not a cause of Y because Y = 0 for both X = 0 and X = 
1.  The general conclusion would be the existence of an interaction effect between X 
and Z as the influence of X on Y varies according to the values of Z.  Actually, this 
would be a misspecified model; in reality, the interaction between both causes is so 
strong that the additive effects of X and of Z on Y disappear in favour of the sole 
conjunction XZ influencing Y. Wunsch: Confounding and control  
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I said above that it is probably better to control for an intervening variable between 
the common cause and the effect, rather than for the common cause itself especially if 
the latter is remote from the treatment/exposure, due to the possible presence of other – 
latent – causes or the temporal reduction of influence for remote common causes.  Here 
is however a case, borrowed from Pearl (2000) and taken up by Greenland and 
Brumback (2002), where this strategy would be wrong. In this model, all the variables 
are observed.  Consider five variables U, V, Z, X, and Y, causally related as in the DAG 
of figure 6, and suppose we are specifically interested in the relation X causes Y. 
 







In this model, contrary to intuition, it is not sufficient to control for the intervening 
variable Z.  Even if U and V are independent, they are associated in some strata in Z as 
they both cause Z.  Due to the association between U and V, U is associated with Y 
through V and V is associated with X through U.  Either V or U must be controlled for 
to remove the confounding. 
 
 
3.9 Common causes and competing risks  
Finally, common causes also have an impact on the way we deal with competing risks.  
For example, in demography it is customary to estimate a net probability of dying at a 
given age in the absence of migration using a counterfactual approach.  If migrants had 
not left the country, what would have been the probability of dying without the 
occurrence of migration?  One usually assumes that both processes are independent, Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 4 
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leading to the well-known Berkson or Schwartz and Lazar formulas (see e.g.  Wunsch  
2002).  Suppose now that a common cause such as marital status influences both 
mortality and migration, which is actually the case.  The two variables are then 
associated, as Reichenbach’s conjunctive forks have shown. Remember that a 
conjunctive fork is a causal structure where two (or more) effects have a common cause 
and where the effects are conditionally independent given the common cause. In this 
case, migration could select persons with different mortality probabilities than non-
migrants and the classic formulas for computing net probabilities would be biased.  As 
one knows in philosophy and statistics, the counterfactual approach is hardly acceptable 
except as a very simplified model; it would be better here to control for the common 
cause(s) if possible.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
Confounders are common causes of both treatment/exposure and of response/outcome.  
Some classical definitions of confounding in epidemiology or in demography, based on 
associations only, are incomplete as they do not consider the causal paths among the 
variables which lead to association.  Confounding is better taken care of by 
randomisation at the design stage of the research.  Randomisation is however unethical 
or impossible to achieve in many social science problems.  In observational studies, 
conditioning on the observed confounders by stratification is recommended but the 
results should not be standardised if there is a strong interaction between the 
confounder and treatment/exposure on the outcome.  If the confounder is latent, 
controlling for observed intervening variables or an observed surrogate confounder, or 
using an instrumental variable, may sometimes be possible depending on the 
knowledge one has concerning latent confounders. Under stronger assumptions, a fixed 
effects regression model can also take into account unobserved heterogeneity if 
longitudinal data are available.  Even when the common cause is observed, it might be 
better in some cases but not in all to control for an intervening factor if other latent 
common causes are suspected or if the common cause is a remote ‘ancestor’ in the 
causal graph.  The research strategy should be based on a thorough knowledge of the 
field and on one’s conceptual framework and causal model.  In practice, as the “true” 
model is unknown, more than one plausible causal model will usually be tested for best 
fit and structural stability, reflecting the limits of our knowledge. 
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